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ABSTRACT 
 
In a renowned essay, Odo Marquard’s set a cornerstone in defining anthropology from 
a history of concepts point of view. In the light of more recent researches, some of his 
conclusions are here reconsidered and criticised. The concept of anthropology, as 
developed by Herder, Kant, Wilhelm von Humboldt, romantic philosophers and 
physicians, and finally by Hegel and some of his followers, offers no evidence for 
Marquard’s alleged opposition between anthropology and philosophy of history. On 
the one side, in Kant’s or Hegel’s work anthropology is not as peripheral as Marquard 
argued; on the other side, romantic anthropologists developed a deep interest towards 
historical perspectives. Rather, anthropology was quite often considered as a non-
metaphysical alternative to psychology. These results also suggest a revision as to the 
role of anthropology on a broader historical scale.  
 
 
 
1. Philosophical Anthropology in the history of concepts 
 
With his essay Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs «Anthropologie» 
seit dem Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts (1965), Odo Marquard set a 
cornerstone in defining philosophical anthropology from the point of view 
of the historian of concepts1. The considerable value of Marquard’s work, 
together with the relative lack of general studies in this area, soon 
imposed the essay as a «classical», helpful in focusing the intrinsically 
difficult, somewhat puzzling meaning of «anthropology» within modern 
thought. Despite occasional criticism, Marquard’s general frame is still 
widely accepted nowadays2. Marquard’s most general claims can be 
briefly summarised as follows: firstly, philosophical anthropology is a 
typically modern enterprise (I). Anthropology is a theory of man, yet not 
                                                 
1 Marquard 1965 (reprinted in Marquard 1973). See also Marquard’s entry 
«Anthropologie» in the influential Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Marquard 
1976). Concerning Marquard’s own contributions to Philosophical Anthropology, see 
Fischer 2008, 441 ff.  
2 The longevity and wide diffusion of Marquard’s theses have been recently pointed 
out by Gisi (2007, 1).   
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any theory of man necessarily implies anthropology: rather, dismissing 
metaphysics and mathematical sciences, anthropology becomes 
«possible» by means of a «turn towards the World-of-Life» (II) and 
becomes «fundamental» by means of a «turn towards nature» (III). 
Accordingly, anthropology gains «a specific and fundamental validity» 
whenever it assumes the role of the «great alternative» to philosophy of 
history; otherwise, it remains «peripheral» (IV)3.  
Consequently, anthropology and philosophy of history mutually 
exclude each other, so that the alternate success of the privileged 
paradigm – either nature or history – in a certain historical age implies 
the regress of the other. In support of his theses, Marquard observes that 
Kant’s bias towards philosophy of history imposes a peripheral role to 
anthropology, which he considers as a mere «embellishment» in his work. 
Marquand then goes on highlighting the dramatic development of 
«romantic» anthropology in the early XIX Century, until the renewed 
decline of anthropology and the triumph of historicism with Hegel’s 
work. Marquard provides a still useful bibliography of romantic 
anthropology, listing dozens of books and journals mentioning 
«anthropology» (or derivates) in their titles. He underlines that many of 
those titles come from physicians, who obviously incline to a naturalistic 
approach4.  
In this work I intend to reconsider some aspects of Marquard’s essay. 
To this purpose, I shall take into account some of Marquard’s examples. 
In the light of more recent researches, those same cases can be better 
considered as relevant counterexamples to Marquard’s views. My 
conclusion is that Marquard’s above mentioned theses (III) and (IV) are 
untenable. Anthropology becomes relevant, in my opinion, whenever it 
goes hand in hand with philosophy of history (§ 2), thus representing – at 
least in many significant cases – the «great alternative» to psychology (§ 
3). This new glance at the considered period also suggests a revision on a 
more general level (§ 4).  
 
 
2. Anthropology and philosophy of history 
 
Rather than concentrating on one single author, I shall consider some 
general features of the period approximately corresponding to Hegel’s 
                                                 
3 Marquard 1965, 211, 214.  
4 Marquard 1965, 214-216. Marquard also discusses further examples and 
contemporary situation.  
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lifetime (1770-1831)5. No doubt that a close connection between 
anthropology and philosophy of history can be ascertained in many cases 
at that time. Some early traces of this process can be detected within the 
debate concerning the «destination of man» (Bestimmung des Menschen). 
This dispute arose within Protestant theology6 and originally dealt with 
individual destination after death; yet, it eventually involved –
 especially, as we shall see, with Kant – more general questions 
concerning the history and the destination of humankind, in a very close 
connection with anthropology7.  
Let us first consider the case of J.G. Herder: in an early unpublished 
writing of 1763, Herder proposes (long time before Kant) a «Copernican 
revolution» of his own, consisting in the identification of philosophy with 
anthropology8. Herder realises his ambitious program many years later, 
in the four books of the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit 
(1784-1791). With this immensely influential work, Herder aims at the 
foundation of a Geschichtsphilosophie, relying upon anthropological 
knowledge. Shape, posture, sensibility, language, reason: everything 
speaks in favour of the human strive for the Divine. On this basis, Herder 
shows that human soul is not doomed to destruction. Man is the final 
result of creation and can reasonably expect a spiritual life after bodily 
death. However, this result concerning human destination is not achieved 
through introspection or meditation. Rather, Herder nourishes his 
anthropology with vast materials borrowed from Buffon’s Histoire 
naturelle and, more generally, from most sciences of man of his time9.  
In his review of the first book of Herder’s Ideas, Kant criticises the lack 
of metaphysical analysis and the abundance of merely analogical 
inferences. In Kant’s view, Herder’s arguments for immortality are thus 
untenable10. In his own writings devoted to anthropology and philosophy 
of history, Kant explicitly assumes that man achieves his «destination» 
only as a species, in history, not as an individual11. Since the study of the 
«character» of living beings allows us to infer their «destination», Kant’s 
                                                 
5 For a broader context, more details and further bibliography see Martinelli 2004.  
6 See Spalding 1748. 
7 On Mendelssohn and Kant see Hinske 1994; on Kant and the «destination of man», 
Brandt 2000, 2007, 2007a; concerning Fichte, Fonnesu 1993. The pervasiveness of this 
debate for the anthropology of the eighteenth century in its entirety was noted by 
Linden 1976, 127.   
8 Herder 1763. Marquard clearly underestimated the role of Herder (and of W. 
Humboldt, see infra).  
9 Herder 1784-91. On Herder’s anthropology see Pross 1987, 2002; Zammito 2002.  
10 Kant 1785, 45. 
11 Kant 1784, 18.  
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anthropology strongly cooperates with his theory of history12. This link 
clearly emerges from the final, sometimes neglected section of Kant’s 
Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, devoted to the «Character of the 
species». Slightly but radically modifying the scholastic definition, Kant 
dynamically defines man an animal rationabile, who still has not achieved 
– as a species – its rational (i.e. moral) destination in history13.  
In the same years, in his unpublished Plan einer vergleichenden 
Anthropologie, Wilhelm von Humboldt develops a comparative outlook 
on anthropology, once again centred on the key concept of «character». 
Since the defining features of man are nature, history and morals, the 
anthropologist must display a threefold disposition: he is a naturalist, a 
historian and a philosopher at the same time14. All the differences among 
human «genera» (Menschengattungen: genders, but also historical ages, 
nationalities, and so on) contribute to define the ideal whole of 
humankind: for this reason, linguistic and national differences must be 
preserved and defended by means of consequent political constitution. 
Here, again, anthropology is the natural ally to philosophy of history. On 
the one side, comparative anthropology gathers its materials from 
historians, biographers and writers; on the other side, anthropology 
provides the philosophical background of historical and political theory, 
granting the desired balance between universalism and historical 
particularity15. 
The general trend towards synergy between anthropology and 
philosophy of history remains preserved during the age of the so-called 
«romantic» anthropology. Let us consider the manifesto of the Zeitschrift 
für die Anthropologie, bearing the promising title Die Aufgabe der 
Anthropologie, written by the journal director, the physician C.F. Nasse16. 
The «fundamental problems» of anthropology, he thinks, are the 
following: «how has man developed; what is man; what will man 
become?»17. Nasse avoids reductionism and naturalism in favour of a 
                                                 
12 Kant 1798, 329. On the concept of character see Munzel 1999. Marquard (1956, 214) 
wholly overlooks this link and speaks of anthropology as «occupying» the branch of 
«Geschichtsphilsophie» (instead of this, in Marquard 1976, 366, Kant’s anthropology 
«occupies» the branch of practical philosophy). Accordingly, he is forced to consider 
Kant’s anthropology as physiological (Marquard 1956, 229), against Kant’s own will 
and understanding. 
13 Kant 1798, 321. 
14 Humboldt 1796, 360. See Trabant 1990.  
15 Humboldt 1796, 336, 342. 
16 Nasse 1823. Marquard (1965, 230) quotes this title. He doesn’t seem to have 
considered its contents.  
17 Nasse 1823, 10.  
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dynamic concept of anthropology, explicitly aiming at a «history of 
humankind». In the third volume of his Die Anthropologie als 
Wissenschaft, devoted to «Pragmatic anthropology» (1823), J. Hillebrand 
explains that pragmatic anthropology considers the perfectioning 
(«Vervollkommnung») of man and essentially deals with human culture. 
Pragmatic anthropology is then not identical with history or philosophy; 
however, it has a great affinity to philosophy of history, since it exposes 
the «internal linkage» of history and philosophy18.   
Many other issues of romantic anthropology consist of a reflection 
upon the history of humankind in a rather spiritual and sometimes 
religious sense. Recalling Herder’s scheme, H. Steffens begins his 
Anthropologie (1822) with a natural history of the Earth and its 
inhabitants, written in the language of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie19. 
However (like Nasse), Steffens considers man as the result of infinite past 
geological eras, in his actual present and as the starting point of an 
endless future spiritual development20. According to Steffens, creation is 
the manifestation of God’s will, and not «the outcome of blind natural 
necessity»: therefore, «nature has its own history, its own living 
development». God’s creatures are all free, and this freedom is the key of 
history: it is «the historical in nature»21. A religious and even «mystical» 
intention permeates Steffens’ anthropology. In this view, Steffens was 
not at all isolated. In J.C. Heinroth’s Lehrbuch der Anthropologie (1822), 
the history of humankind is presented as a sort of anthropological 
confirmation of the Bible22. Heinroth, a physician and the author of a 
famous treatise on psychiatry, clearly shows spiritualistic tendencies23. 
According to Heinroth, man certainly belongs to both nature and spirit, 
yet he considers «bodily life» as «an instrument, an organ, a servant», 
wholly subdued to a superior and dominating «spiritual life»24. 
Accordingly, Heinroth’s explanation of the history of humankind turns 
out to be a scientific transposition of the Biblical account.  
In short, the romantic idea of the unity of spirit with nature, which is 
the key of anthropology’s success at that time, does not necessarily imply 
                                                 
18 Hillebrand 1823, 10 f. 
19 For this reason, Marquard (1965, 228 f.) quotes Steffens as an example of 
naturalism in romantic anthropology. 
20 Steffens 1823, 12. 
21 Steffens 1823, 264-265.  
22 Heinroth 1822, 278. Marquard (1965, 216) acknowledges a «theological» drift only 
in the last phase (e.g. Ennemoser) of romantic anthropology, as well as «in the late 
idealism in general».  
23 Landmann 1962, 408; Poggi 2000, 551.  
24 Heinroth 1822, 43.  
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a naturalistic view. Rather, even when physicians are involved, romantic 
anthropology is quite more complex than a merely psychophysical 
doctrine of the human being. The origin and the development of the 
spiritual side of man is frequently regarded as the result of a transcendent 
intention. The task of anthropology is to explain this process, and the 
historical epiphany of the spiritual, starting from man’s natural side. 
Nature is the beginning, history is the end and the goal of anthropology.  
All this said, the presence of naturalistic approaches to anthropology at 
that time is obviously far from being excluded. Following certain 
tendencies represented in Germany by Ernst Platner25, or contemporary 
French models26, many philosophers and physicians conceive 
anthropology as a naturalistic theory concerning the relationship between 
body and mind27. Yet, this idea of anthropology is neither exclusive, nor, 
in my opinion, particularly relevant. On the contrary, most influential 
authors develop a radically different idea of the matter, closely related to 
their philosophical theories of history. On the one side, Marquard 
underestimates (or ignored) the close cooperation between anthropology 
and philosophy of history e.g. in Herder, Kant, Wilhelm von Humboldt; 
on the other side, he misses the deep spiritual, religious and historical 
commitment of many anthropologists (both philosophers and physicians) 
during the romantic age28. In any case, anthropology cannot be 
adequately defined and understood in terms of its opposition and mutual 
exclusion with philosophy of history. 
 
 
3. Anthropology and psychology  
 
Rather, in many cases, anthropology competes with psychology for a 
leading role. The reason why Marquard neglected the role of psychology 
in defining the concept of anthropology is not clear to me. After all, it was 
rather an obvious step to take, since the two disciplines have much to do 
with each other. For this reason, the study of the dialectic relationship 
between psychology and anthropology allows us to understand the 
development of anthropology more satisfactorily. Quite frequently, they 
                                                 
25 Platner 1772; see Kosenina 1989; Naschert-Stienings 2007.  
26 See Moravia 1978, 1982.  
27 For the second half of the eighteenth century, see Linden 1976, 36 ff. This also holds 
for many of the items in Marquard’s list for the first half of the ninteenth century 
(1965, 230-232; 1976, 367).  
28 I shall discuss Hegel in the next paragraph. Disregarding the role of psychology, as 
Marquard did, would hamper a proper understanding of his view of anthropology.  
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have been identified with each other, yet sometimes psychology and 
anthropology have been the banner of different, even of opposed 
philosophical intentions. In my view, this latter occurrence defines the 
exact moment in which anthropology attains its specificity, and finally, 
its raison d’être.  
In the Critique of pure reason, Kant explicitly distances himself from 
empirical psychology, the discipline introduced by Wolff in 1732 and 
further developed by Baumgarten29. After its necessary divorce from 
metaphysics, Kant suggests, psychology should find its proper place 
within the field (still to be fully developed) of anthropology30. Since the 
winter semester 1772-1773, when he begun his lessons in anthropology at 
the University of Königsberg, Kant had adopted this new denomination 
in order to avoid confusion with scholastic psychology, which was 
conceived as a part of metaphysics31. A letter to Markus Herz of 1773 
shows that Kant, at the same time, took particular care in specifying that 
his lexical choice in favour of anthropology did not imply any adoption of 
a deterministic views on man, similar to Platner’s32. Actually, Kant 
borrows many ideas from scholastic psychology in the first part of his 
Anthropologie33. However, this does not exhaust his concept of 
anthropology. Kant considers the Didactic as an anthropological 
«Doctrine of the Elements», providing an empirical description of all 
available materials (thoughts, feelings, volitions), whereas the subsequent 
Characteristic plays the role of the anthropological «Methodology», 
illustrating the destination of man according to his manifold 
«character»34. Kant repeatedly underlines the difference between 
empirical psychology, as a metaphysical and «scholastic» discipline, and 
anthropology35.  
His contemporary audience took this distinction between psychology 
and anthropology for granted. In his destructive review, published in 
1798 in the Athenaeum, F.D. Schleiermacher suggests that Kant’s theory 
was, in any case, diametrally opposed to the obsolete and execrated 
                                                 
29 The drafts of Kant’s lessons are available in Kant 1997; see Brandt-Stark 1997.  
30 Kant 1787, 548.  
31 See Brandt 1999, Brandt-Stark 1997.  
32 Kant 1773. In the same spirit, Kant will soon adopt and permanently maintain a 
«pragmatic» rather than «physiologic» view of anthropology: see Kant 1798, 119.  
33 See Hinske 1996, 2002, who possibly overestimates Kant’s general dependence on 
scholastic psychology. 
34 See Kant 1798, 412; 1997, 1530; 1923, 661. On the anthropological Characteristic 
see Manganaro 1983, Brandt 1999, Sturm 2009.  
35 Kant 1798, 161; see also Kant 1923, 800, 801.  
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scholastic psychology, whose recent disappearance he warmly welcomes36. 
Goethe and Schiller agree that Kant’s work can be read from the point of 
view of a «pathological» side of man37. Much more than a «faculty 
psychology», Kant’s Didactic is actually a pathology of human faculties, 
whose negativity is balanced by the subsequent thoughts on character 
and destination of the human species. Notwithstanding his refusal of 
Kant’s pragmatic approach to anthropology, also J.F. Fries sharply 
distinguishes between «philosophical anthropology» and the empirical 
psychology of the «Eklektiker»38. Despite some occasionally synonymous 
or synergic usage39, an alternative and mutually exclusive function of 
anthropology and psychology can be ascertained in many significant 
cases. Unsurprisingly, the most notable champion of scientific psychology 
in the first half of the XIX Century, J.F. Herbart, is among the harshest 
critics of anthropology, a discipline which he considers an inappropriate 
mix of psychology and «somatology»40. In fact, as we have seen, a 
psychophysical approach to anthropology was well represented at the 
time.   
In Hegel’s Encyclopaedia, Anthropology is the first part of the 
Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, followed by Phenomenology of Spirit 
and Psychology41. According to Hegel, Anthropology is the doctrine of 
«soul», dialectically elevating itself from its proximity to nature to higher 
levels of «conscience» (Phenomenology) and, finally «spirit» 
(Psychology). In many respects, Hegel inverts the usual internal 
structure of anthropology. Whereas Kant started from individuals and 
ended with the history of humankind, Hegel’s anthropology begins with a 
plurality of «characters» and moves towards the unicity of an internally 
concentrated subjectivity, leading the way towards «conscience» and 
Phenomenology. In its anthropological path, the soul repeatedly faces a 
dialectical negative instance, whose features are borrowed from the vast 
repertoire of romantic anthropology, which Hegel knows surprisingly 
well42. It is only through psychical pathology and – à la lettre – pre-
                                                 
36 Schleiermacher 1799.  
37 Both letters are reprinted in Malter 1980, 336 f.  
38 Fries 1831, 31.  
39 See Linden 1976, 63 ff.; 120.  
40 Herbart 1823, 190.  
41 Hegel 1830. The section is explicitly entitled «Anthropology» in the second and 
third edition (1827, 1830).  
42 See Petry 1978, 441 ff. (notes). Marquard (1965, 217) thinks that Hegel’s attempt to 
subordinate anthropology to philsophy of history implies the «degradation of 
anthropology». Hegel’s inclusion of anthropology in the Encyclopaedia would then 
mean a critique of the romantics, who merely caught the «An-sich» of man. However, 
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conscious phenomena like suggestion or hypnotism (and so on), that the 
soul frees itself in the direction of phenomenological Bewusstsein.  
Thus, it was only in the hands of Hegel’s followers that anthropology 
lost its strategical importance43. Most significantly, to a great extent this 
loss of importance is the loss of a specific difference from psychology. This 
process can be easily revealed within the so-called right-wing 
Hegelianism. C.L. Michelet was probably the most consequent thinker 
who explicitly identifies anthropology and psychology44. Zealously 
attempting to reform Hegel’s Philosophy of the Subjective Spirit, 
Michelet struggles to restore the original function of Phenomenology, as 
expounded by Hegel in the Jena version. Consequently, Phenomenology 
becomes a general introduction to philosophy, pre-existent and external 
to the system. Thus, what remains of the Subjective Spirit, i.e. 
anthropology and psychology, necessarily merges into a unified 
Philosophie des subjectiven Geistes. Unfortunately, this move neutralised 
any philosophical potential of anthropology (and of psychology, too) in 
the less formal version of most Hegelians like J.E. Erdmann, who simply 
identifies psychology with Philosophy of Subjective Spirit45. Much more 
interesting, of course, are the vicissitudes of the concept of anthropology 
among the left-wing Hegelians, from Feuerbach to the young Marx and 
beyond. Yet, our present task is confined to an analysis of the 
development of this matter until approximately Hegel’s death46.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
To sum up, anthropology becomes (in Marquard’s terms) «peripheral» 
whenever it diverges from philosophy of history, thus embracing an 
oversimplified psychophysical perspective, as in Herbart’s criticism. On 
the contrary, anthropology becomes philosophically relevant whenever it 
refuses such naïve naturalism, rather reflecting upon the various physical 
                                                                                                                                                        
with similar arguments one could also infer that phenomenology is irrelevant since it 
merely concerns the «Für-sich», and so on: nothing (but pure philosophy) could then 
avoid «degradation». As in the case of Kant, Marquard’s negative attitude partly 
depends on the painful state of the art concerning these two chapters in the history of 
philosophy at the time. For instance, Marquard takes no notice of the deep 
Aristotelian roots of Hegel’s anthropology (see Ferrarin 2001, 234 ff.).   
43 On the contrary, Marquard (1965, 217) simply identifies Hegel’s with Michelet’s 
positions. 
44 Michelet 1840, V.  
45 Erdmann 1847, 1; see also 1837.  
46 For further developments, see Martinelli 2004, 115 ff. 
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and moral «characters» of man, on the purpose (or «vocation», 
Bestimmung) of individuals, genders, ages of man, peoples (including wild 
ones), races, historical ages and finally, of all humankind. A dynamic and 
flexible vision of human nature, which is no longer considered immutable, 
is the basis of this idea of anthropology. Anthropology makes philosophy 
of history possible, and philosophy of history makes anthropology 
relevant. In this process, anthropology is mostly conceived as an 
alternative to psychology, whose approach typically disregards long-term 
historical view.  
Although these claims refer to the considered period, they could 
suggest a revision of many aspects in the received idea of anthropology on 
a more general level. Anthropology has a precise function within modern 
philosophical discourse, focusing attention on the human «world-of-life», 
as Marquard asserted, yet without embracing naturalism at the cost of 
neglecting history. Rather, anthropology attains relevance through its 
opposition to radical naturalism in the study of man, and quite often 
(although not necessarily), this goal is achieved through a parallel, 
synergic philosophy of history. At the same time, anthropology is also 
typically sensitive to scientific results. Quite often, it tries to integrate 
them and thus to present itself in a sort of mediatory position (sharply 
criticised, as such, by many philosophers).  
The case of Hermann Lotze, philosopher and physician who begun his 
career defending a «physiology of the soul» against the theory of 
Lebenskraft and became later famous for his Mikrokosmus (a philosophy 
of history work, and an «essay in anthropology», as the subtitle goes), is 
not isolated47. In Wilhelm von Humboldt’s elegant synthesis, the 
«dangerous cliff» to be avoided in any judgment concerning man is «to 
consider man always – and yet never enough – a natural being»48.  
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